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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2634 
___________ 
 
ABDUS SHAHID, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF EDDYSTONE  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-02501) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Filed:  November 6, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM
 Abdus Shahid, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order entering 
judgment in favor of the Borough of Eddystone (the “Borough”).  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm.   
. 
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I. 
 In 2007, Shahid, a United States citizen and native of Bangladesh, bought a single-
family dwelling located in the Borough.  He rented it as a duplex to various tenants, but 
never obtained a certificate of occupancy (“COS”) as required by the Borough’s 
ordinance.  In 2008, he received his first citation for failure to obtain a COS.  During an 
inspection to determine whether a COS should issue, the Borough found twenty-five code 
violations and gave Shahid approximately six weeks to correct them and schedule another 
inspection. 
 Shahid failed to arrange for another inspection and received a second citation for 
failure to obtain a COS.  In 2010, his property was inspected again.  After finding thirty-
four code violations, the Borough posted a notice that the property was uninhabitable, 
and issued Shahid a third citation for failure to obtain a COS.  Undeterred, Shahid 
continued to rent the property, prompting yet another inspection in 2011.  In addition to 
finding twenty-eight code violations and again posting uninhabitable notices, the 
Borough cited Shahid for failure to cut the grass and remove snow from his sidewalk.  
Shahid was convicted of violating the Borough’s ordinances, as set forth in the citations.1
 Shahid then filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming 
that the Borough discriminated against him on the basis of his race, national origin, and 
     
                                              
1 After the Borough moved for summary judgment, the District Court determined that 
Shahid was barred by the Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman doctrines from 
challenging the validity of his convictions for violating the Borough’s ordinances.  (Dkt. 
No. 27.)  Shahid has not challenged that on appeal.   
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religion, thereby violating his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C.
II. 
, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978).  He alleged that the 
Borough’s actions were part of a scheme to prevent “people of Bangladesh origin” from 
living in a “white area,” (Dkt. No. 1, p. 2), and that the Borough enforced its laws against 
him and not against white property owners.  After conducting a bench trial on Shahid’s 
discrimination claims, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Borough.  
Shahid appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Shahid argues that the District 
Court’s order was based on incorrect findings of fact and should be reversed.  In 
response, the Borough argues that Shahid’s appeal should be dismissed for failure to 
make the trial transcript part of the record, or, alternatively, asks that we affirm the 
District Court’s entry of judgment in its favor because Shahid has not met his burden of 
proving that the District Court’s factual determinations were clearly erroneous.   
 We will first address the Borough’s argument that Shahid’s appeal should be 
dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b), which 
requires an appellant to order a transcript of the parts of the District Court proceedings 
that he considers necessary to his appeal.  Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)(A).  If an appellant 
fails to follow Rule 10(b), we have recognized that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
3(a)(2) permits us to dismiss the appeal.  Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2); Horner Equip. Int’l, Inc. 
v. Seascape Pool Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1989).  However, dismissing an 
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appeal for failure to satisfy Rule 10(b) is disfavored.  Id. at 93.  Before doing so, we must 
consider “whether the defaulting party’s action is willful or merely inadvertent, whether a 
lesser sanction can bring about compliance and the degree of prejudice the opposing 
party has suffered because of the default.”  Id. (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co.
 Prior to filing its brief, the Borough filed a motion to dismiss Shahid’s appeal for, 
among other things, failure to comply with Rule 10(b).  The Clerk issued an order 
denying the motion and granting the Borough leave to file a supplemental appendix 
containing the trial transcript.  The Borough failed to do so.  It is true that Shahid was on 
notice of Rule 10(b)'s requirements, but because the Borough declined the opportunity to 
supplement the record (and mindful of Shahid's pro se status), we cannot fairly say that 
the Borough was prejudiced because of Shahid's failure to comply with a procedural rule. 
, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
Therefore, we will not dismiss his appeal solely on that basis.   
 We turn now to the Borough’s argument that Shahid fails to establish that any of 
the District Court’s findings were clearly erroneous.  After a bench trial, the District 
Court found that the Borough “did not have a policy or custom of excluding people . . . 
based on race, religion, or national origin” and that it “did not discriminate against Shahid 
. . . .”  (Dkt. No. 30,  p. 5.)  The District Court determined that “Shahid’s testimony was 
not credible” and that his statements “appear[ed] calculated to meet [his] burden of proof 
under Monell.”  (Dkt. No. 31, pp. 8-9.)  Apart from being inadmissible hearsay, certain of 
Shahid’s documentary evidence was also found to be fabricated.  (Id. p. 9 n.13.)  Because 
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Shahid produced “no credible evidence” of discrimination, the District Court found that 
his Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated and entered judgment in favor of the 
Borough.  (Id.
 We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a); 
 p. 13.)   
Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, N.J., 134 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 
1998).  “To the extent that the District Court’s conclusions rested on credibility 
determinations, our review is particularly deferential.”  Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 609 F.3d 143, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because credibility determinations 
are “quintessentially the province of the trial court,” we reject them only in “rare 
circumstances.”  Dardovitch v. Haltzman
 Such rare circumstances are not present in this case.  Shahid’s brief is replete with 
unsupported statements that the District Court’s decision was based on “incorrect facts.”  
Yet, he offers nothing substantive from the record below to support his assertions that the 
District Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations were clearly erroneous.  
We therefore defer to the District Court and will not disturb its findings on appeal.   
, 190 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered May 23, 
2012, will be affirmed. 
